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PAP’S A.M. V. CITY OF ERIE1: THE WRONG ROUTE TO THE 
RIGHT DECISION 
 
While the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln 
Center to  those who can pay the price may differ vastly in 
content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by 
critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by 
the person [at the local pub].2 
 
As the United States emerged from the sexual revolution of the late 
1960’s, courts and policy makers battled over the role the government should 
play in setting the moral tone for the nation.3  One of the hottest battle grounds 
of this debate has been the role of the government in limiting expression and 
actions of a sexual nature.4  While the Supreme Court has clearly defined the 
role the government can play in limiting obscenity5 and child pornography,6 
courts across the nation have struggled with the limitations local governments 
can place on nude dancing.7  
                                                 
1 Pap’s A.M. v City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 
Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). 
2 Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974) aff’d in part, Doran v. 
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) 
3 See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 (1973) (holding women have a 
fundamental right to reproductive freedom);  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 
(1986) (stating there is not a fundamental right to have homosexual sex).  
4 See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing the current 
standards for obscenity); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) 
(ruling that a zoning ordinance which prohibited an adult movie theater from locating 
within 1000 feet of a residential property, church, park, or school was constitutional). 
5 In Miller, the Court held obscenity was not an expression protected by the First 
Amendment. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-5. The Court established a narrow three prong test 
for obscenity. Id.   
6 In Ferber v. New York , the Court held that child pornography was not protected by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because of the physical and 
psychological effect on the children depicted in the materials. Ferber v. New York, 458 
U.S. 747, 756 (1982).  
7 Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that a the application of a nudity 
law to nude dancing was constitutional); Cf., Gianni P. Servodidio, Comment, The 
Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of Expression Protected by the First 
Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231, 1233-35 (1992). Servodidio states that the current debate 
over the limitations of adult business is a result of the “failed test” established in Miller. 
Because many individuals might find materials that fail to meet the Miller test offensive 
according to contemporary community standards, “many cities and states have found 
1
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This note will examine the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie,8 by looking at the policy behind the decision,9 while 
also examining the decision in light of the previous United States Supreme 
Court decision  in Barnes v. Glen Theatre.10  The note will examine why the 
decision in Pap’s A.M. was an unnecessary misinterpretation of the United 
States Constitution.11  It will examine how and why the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court could have settled the issue of nude dancing in Pennsylvania and 
avoided review by the United States Supreme Court by deciding the case 
under the Pennsylvania Constitution instead of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Finally, this note will examine the ramifications of 
this choice of law when the United States Supreme Court hears this case 
during the 1999-2000 term.12  
 
I.  BACKROUND 
 
In Pap’s A.M.,13 the major issue involved the constitutionality of an Erie, 
Pennsylvania nudity ordinance.  This section of the note will examine the 
method courts have used to analyze restrictions on nude dancing including 
whether nude dancing is expression, the theories of content-based and 
content-neutral limitations, and the overbreadth doctrine. 
 
A.  Nude Dancing as Expression 
 
The legal basis for the protection of nude dancing evolves under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,14 and in 
the various states from similar constitutional provisions.15    
                                                                                                                         
inventive ways to avoid the rigorous Miller test by suppressing nonobscene eroticism 
indirectly.” Id. 
8 Pap’s A.M. v City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 
1999 Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999).   
9 Infra Analysis section I.  
10 Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); See, Infra Analysis section 
II. 
11
 Infra Analysis section III. 
12 On May 17, 1999, the United States Supreme Court  granted a writ of 
certiorari in Pap’s A.M v. City of Erie, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY  90 (Pocket ed. 1996)      
   
13 Pap’s A.M. v City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 
Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (freedom of speech); BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY  90 (Pocket 
ed. 1996) (equal protection under the law);  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 572 
2
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The first step courts take in analyzing whether an action is afforded 
First Amendment protection is a determination of whether the action is 
expressive.16  While the text of the First Amendment states “Congress 
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech,”17 the United 
States Supreme Court has held that speech is not merely limited to the 
spoken or written word.18  The Court has nearly been unanimous in 
holding that nude dancing is expressive conduct.19  
                                                                                                                         
(1991) (deciding in a plurality opinion that an Indiana nudity statute as applied too 
nude dancing was constitutional); Lisa Malmer, Comment, Nude Dancing and the First 
Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (1991);  The theories regarding regulation 
of nude dancing generally fall into four theories which can be seen in the split of 
opinions of the Supreme Court in Barnes.    
15 See, e.g., Pa. CONST., art. I, sec. 7. which states “[t]he free communication of thoughts and 
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and 
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Id.  
16 James H. Taylor, Note, Constitutional Law: Nude Dancing’s Marginal Status Under 
the First Amendment, 44 FLA. L. REV. 141 (1992). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
18 Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding that burning the American 
Flag was expressive conduct and a law banning the burning of the American 
flag was unconstitutional because it limited political expression)., Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
189, 194  (1983). Stone writes,  “the Court begins with the presumption that the 
first amendment protects all communication and then creates areas of 
nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech 
does not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of the first amendment.” 
Id.  
19
 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991).  In Barnes, eight of the Justices 
held that nude dancing was expression.  Malmer, supra note 14, at 1276. The view of the 
Court that nude dancing is expressive is a relatively new concept. Id.  During the 1950’s and 
60’s the Court did not recognize First Amendment protection for nude dancing. Id. However, 
as America began to emerge from the sexual revolution, the courts recognized the 
expressive elements of entertainment. Id. The Court clarified this theory when eight of the 
Justices recognized the expressive nature and constitutional protection of nude dance in 
Barnes. Id. The Court in several case began to recognize entertainment as expressive 
conduct entitled to First amendment protection.  See e.g. , Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 
161 (1974) (holing film was afforded First and Fourteenth Amendment protection); Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (establishing the standards of 
constitutional protection for broadcasting). Cf., Barnes 501 U.S. at 580, (Scalia J. 
concurring). Scalia wrote nude dancing was not protected conduct. Id. According to Scalia, 
“[m]oral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its prohibition, and since the First 
Amendment has no application to this case no more than that is needed.”. Id. See, Robert 
3
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In Texas v. Johnson,20 the Court not only recognized the expressive 
nature of burning the flag, but also set out a two prong test to determine what 
is expression.21  The Court stated that an action is expressive and within the 
scope of the First Amendment if an “intent to convey a particularized message 
was present and the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who view it."22 The theory that nude dancing is protected 
by the First Amendment is based on a presumption that nude dancing 
“expresses a message.”23 
 
The lone Justice that argued that nude dancing was not expressive was 
Justice Scalia.24  Justice Scalia wrote, the state has a traditional right and duty 
to punish anti-social behavior even if the audience chooses to view the 
entertainment.25  Scalia argued that general laws are not invalid because the 
conduct being restricted was for expressive purposes, but rather the tradition 
and the culture of the people will determine if conduct is worthy of First 
Amendment protection.26  According to Scalia, the legislature needs only a 
                                                                                                                         
Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1995). The 
court doctrine that allocates constitutional protection if a speaker intends to convey a 
message is not plausible.  Id. See, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (arguing the founding father only sought to 
protect political speech.)   
20 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 109. 
21 Id. 
22
 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089. Nude dancing meets this test. Id.  As Circuit Judge Cudahy 
wrote, “[i]t seems to me beyond doubt that a barroom striptease is ‘expressive.’ Even if 
relatively restrained a striptease sends an unadorned message to a male audience. It is a 
message of temptation and allurement coupled with coy hints at satisfaction.” Id.  
23 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 109;  Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).  
24 See e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576. 
25 Id. In writing about the Indiana nudity law in Barnes, Justice Scalia states: 
[I]f 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosier 
Dome to display their genitals to one another, even if there 
were not an offended innocent in the crowd. Our society 
prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain 
activities not because they harm others but because they are 
considered, in the traditional phrase, "contra bonos mores," 
i.e., immoral.  
Id. Cf., Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089,(Posner J., concurring) The theory that nude 
dancing is not expression is a misapplication of the obscenity doctrine. Id. Society 
established a standard to limit obscene dancing. Id 
26 Id.  See e.g., Post, supra note 19, at 1251. A law against defaming public buildings 
4
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rational basis to limit nude dancing, because nude dancing is outside the 
perimeters of the First Amendment.27  
 
B.  Content-Based Restrictions28 
 
While all expression does not have First Amendment protection,29  once 
words or actions are determined to be protected expression, the 
constitutionality of a governmental limitation is the product of a two-tiered 
analysis.30   The first step in the analysis is to determine if the goal of the law is 
to end expression.31 The second step is a determination whether the limitations 
are an attempt to quite the expression because of the message it conveys.32  If 
the limitation meets both these tests it is content-based.33 If a limitation is 
                                                                                                                         
would not be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment because of the 
message that is spray painted on the side of a building. Id.     
27
 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580. See, Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) 
(explaining the rational basis test grants deference to legislative action if there is a 
legitimate governmental purpose that will be forwarded by the law). See, Robert C. 
Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims In The Supreme Court From The 1971 Term 
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 359 (1999).  When a court uses a rational 
basis test the court grants deference to the will of the legislature. Id. The court does 
not examine the real purpose of a law but instead only requires some legitimate 
purpose. Id.   
28 Stone, supra note 18, at 189.  “Perhaps the most intriguing feature of contemporary first 
amendment doctrine is the increasingly invoked distinction between content-based and 
content- neutral restrictions on expression. Id.  
29 Allan Ides and Christopher N. May, Constitutional Law: Individual Rights- 
Examples and Explanations 273 (1998),  See, e.g. Miller, 415 U.S. at 15 (holding 
obscenity was not afforded First Amendment protection); See, e.g., Terminiello 
v. V. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949) (ruling offensive and provocative words 
likely to cause an immediate and serious harm [fighting words] are not 
afforded First Amendment protection); See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969) (holding words “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to produce such action” are not protected by the 
First Amendment); See, e.g., New York Times  v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) . 
30
 Taylor, supra note 16, at 141. 
31 Id.  
32 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-92 (2d ed. 1988); 
see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1989) (“An ordinance which regulates 
speech due to its potential primary impact. . . must be considered content-
based.”).   
33 Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (1988); See, David L. Hudson Jr., The Secondary Effects 
Doctrine: The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 
59 (1997). Distinctions between content based and content neutral restrictions 
5
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determined to be content-based, it is subject to strict scrutiny.34   A  limitation to 
be constitutional must  serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest.35  The application of the strict scrutiny analysis to 
expression is “speech-protective”36 which is virtually an absolute protection.37  
 
The content-based theory contends that limitations on nude dancing 
are attempts to limit the message of the dance.38 This theory argues the 
reason behind nudity laws is to limit people in public places where nudity would 
be inappropriate and offensive, not to stop expression.39  The theory contends 
limitations on nude dancing are intended to stop a message which may not be 
                                                                                                                         
are largely the product of the intent of the creator of the restrict. Id. If the 
intent is to limit the message then the restriction is content based and subject 
to a higher level of scrutiny. Id at 60. 
34 Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (1988). 
35 Id., Stone, supra note 18, at 201. Stone writes, “Under current doctrine, 
however, the Court subjects the content-based restrictions to a more stringent 
standard of justification than the more suppressive content-neutral 
restrictions.” Id  at 203.   
36
 Stone, supra note 18, at 196.  
37 Id. Cf., Paul B. Stephen III., The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. 
L. REV.  203, 205 (1982). Stephen writes   the Court’s  contention of a near-absolute content 
neutrality rule is not evidenced by the Court’s decisions. Id.  Stephen writes, “This 
divergence of judicial doctrine and judicial action has prompted confusion and concern. The 
lower courts have tried to interpret the mixed signals they have received from the Court, but 
the disarray of their decisions suggests the difficulty of their task.” Id. at 206.     
38
 Barnes, 501 U.S at 591.  
39
 In Barnes, 501 U.S. at 591, Justice White wrote: 
Legislators do not just randomly select certain 
conduct for proscription; they have reasons for 
doing so and those reasons illuminate the purpose 
of the law that is passed. Indeed, a law may have 
multiple purposes. The purpose of forbidding people 
to appear nude in parks, beaches, hot dog stands, 
and like public places is to protect others from 
offense. But that could not possibly be the purpose 
of preventing nude dancing in theaters and 
barrooms since the viewers are exclusively 
consenting adults who pay money to see these 
dances. The purpose of the proscription in these 
contexts is to protect the viewers from what the 
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accepted by the majority of the public, and eliminate the message,40 allowing 
the government to sanction one type of expression over another.41   
 
A determination of whether speech is content-based or content-neutral 
generally decides the constitutionality of a limitation on expression .42  The  
Court turns to the motivation behind a law to determine whether it is content-
based. 43  The  Court will apply a content-based analysis if they believe the 
limitation creates a "deliberate interference" with a certain message.44 
 
C.  Content-Neutral Limitations 
 
If an analysis indicates that a law is not intended to suppress a 
message, the regulation is  content-neutral.45  The test for content-neutral 
expression was established in United States v. O’Brien.46  The O’Brien test 
requires a restriction  (1) be within the constitutional power of the government; 
(2) serve a “substantial government interest;”47 (3) not be related to the 
suppression of free expression;48 and (4) not be any greater than necessary to 
                                                 
40 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089,(Posner J., concurring). Posner states that 
"differentiating between nude dance and other forms of expression is a 
“judge- made exception for 'expressive' nudity discriminates between upper-
class and lower-class nonobscene erotica." Id.  
41 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 593 (White J., dissenting). Limitations on nudity in an adult club 
is a type of class heresy in which the message expressed by exotic dancers is 
limited, while the message of highbrow theatre or ballet would not be limited; Id. “[T]he 
performances. . .  may not be high art, to say the least, and may not appeal to the 
Court, is hardly an excuse for distorting and ignoring settled doctrine. The Court's 
assessment of the artistic merits of nude dancing performances should not be the 
determining factor in deciding this case.” Id at 594. Cf. Stone, supra note 18, at 196, 
contends that Court balance the level of protection a class of expression is entitled to 
by balancing the protection the class receives.  Id.  Stone cites obscenity, 
commercial speech, and fighting words as examples of the balancing. Id. at 197.     
42 See Hudson, supra note 33, at 58.  
43 Thomas R. McCoy,  A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and 
Religion Clause Case, 48 VAND L. REV. 1335, 1355 (1995) (writing that the court looks 
at motivation behind a  law to determine if the law is content-based). 
44  Id.  
45
 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
46 Id.; Servodidio, supra note 7, at 1250. The O'Brien Court had concluded 
punishment for burning a draft card punished only the non-communicative 
element of the act even though the act contained communicative elements. Id. 
  
47 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
48 Id.  
7
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serve the substantial government interest.49 
 
The application of the O’Brien test to nude dancing has been analyzed 
two different ways.50  The first application contends that limitations against 
nudity do not effect the  message of the dance.51 The laws effect nudity, which 
was a non-speech element of the performance.52 The fact that the law permits 
the same performance to occur if the dancer wares “pasties and a G-string,”53 
indicates that the erotic message of the dance could still be presented absent 
the nudity.54  
 
The second application of the O’Brien content-neutral analysis 
evaluates nude dancing using a “secondary effect” analysis.55  In Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres,56 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance which prevented 
adult theaters from opening within a large part of the city.57   
 
The Court allowed the limitations in Renton to stand on the grounds 
that the ordinance was enacted to eliminate the crimes associated with an adult 
oriented business.58 The Court agreed that this ordinance was not intended to 
limit the message exhibited by the adult theaters and was “a valid governmental 
response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters.”59 
                                                 
49
 Id. 
50 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991)  
51 Id. at 571 (Rehnquist CJ.) (limiting an Indiana nudity statute punish the non-
expressive elements of the dance).   
52 Id.  
53 Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1 section 1 (b) (1988) (defining nudity and stating that a 
person wearing pasties and a g-string would not be nude). 
54 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571; cf. Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 
1990), rev’d Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991), Judge Posner 
contends that nudity may be required in today’s society to provide the 
message intended from the dance.  He argues “[a] striptease that ended in a 
degree of nudity no longer suggestive of preparations for sex -- a striptease 
that left the stripper garbed as she might be for an expedition to the 
supermarket -- might lack erotic punch today.” 
55 See e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); See e.g., Barnes 501 U.S. at 
582.; Hudson supra note 33, at 62, the application of the secondary effects doctrine has been 
almost only been used to control  adult oriented businesses.     
56 Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  
57 Id. at 51;  Daniel J. McDonald, comment, Regulating Sexual Oriented Businesses: 
The Regulatory Uncertainties of a “ Regime of Prohibition by Indirection and the 
Obscenity Communal Solution,  1997 BYU L. REV. 339, 342 (1997) (arguing the control 
of adult oriented businesses by zoning laws is a legal fiction).    
58 Id. 
59 Id. Cf., In his dissent Justice Brennan wrote that the City of Renton  “selectively 
8
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D.  The Overbreadth Doctrine 
 
One of the strongest challenges that can be made to a limitation on 
free expression is the overbreadth doctrine.60  The overbreadth doctrine is an 
exception to the normal rules of standing only available in First Amendment 
cases.61 The Court explained:    
 
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual 
whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted 
to challenge a statute on its face "because it [the statute]  also 
threatens others not before the court--those who desire to 
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain 
from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to 
have the law declared partially invalid.62 
 
If a statute is determined to by overly broad the statute is unconstitutional “on 
its face” and a court can invalidate the statute as a whole.63  
 
The policy behind the doctrine is that overly broad limitations on 
expression can have a chilling effect on areas of expression that are clearly 
protected by the First Amendment.64 Courts have required that a statute be 
substantially overly broad before they elicit the use of the overbreadth doctrine 
                                                                                                                         
imposes limitations on the location of a movie theater based exclusively on the 
content of the films shown there. . . ." Id. at 55 (Brennan J., dissenting). Hudson, 
supra note 33, at 62, “the secondary effects doctrine has engendered an assault on 
the adult entertainment industry. The doctrine empowers those who dislike adult 
expression to restrict it under the guise of protecting society.”   Vincent Blasi, Six 
Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude 
Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611, 655 (1992) . Blasi argues the First Amendment 
is best interpreted by the use of broad propositions. Id. He contends when the Court 
decides First Amendment issues based on the fairness of the specific facts of a case, 
 it abdicates its duty to determine the law. Id.     
60 Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1994) (ruling a nudity 
ordinance was overly broad); Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 
U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (upholding the right of a minister to distribute religious materials 
in an airport). 
61 City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 468 U.S. 789, 801 (1981). In 
Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court said: "there must be a realistic danger that the 
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of 
parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Id. 
62 Board of Airport Comm’rs, 482 U.S. at 574.   
63 Id. 
64 TRIBE, supra note 32, at 803.  
9
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and declare a statute unconstitutional.65  
 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
 
On September 24, 1994, the City of Erie, Pennsylvania enacted City 
Ordinance 75-1994.66  The ordinance stated it was a crime to appear in a 
“state of nudity.”67 In order not to violate  the ordinance, a female older than 
                                                 
65 Board of Airport Comm’rs, 482 U.S. at 574, the court said that the policy of sparing 
use of the overbreadth doctrine was a result of the fact that the doctrine was “strong 
medicine.” Id. Cf. Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1077 (1997). Hill contends , the courts claim that the 
overbreadth doctrine is used only in cases where a statute is substantially overly 
broad is a fallacy. Id. Hill contends courts will not invalidated a statute if it can be 
saved by simply changing the statute. Id.  
66 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. 
LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999).  
67 ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 75-1994, states in relevant part:  
1. A person who knowingly or intentionally in a public place:  
a. engages in sexual intercourse;  
b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse as defined by 
the Pennsylvania  Crimes Code;  
c. appears in a state of nudity, or  
d. fondles the genitals of himself, herself or another 
person commits Public Indecency, a Summary Offense.  
2. "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female 
genital (sic), pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque 
covering;  the showing of the female breast with less than a fully 
opaque covering of any part of the nipple;  the exposure of any 
device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or 
simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal 
region or pubic hair region;  or the exposure of any device worn 
as a cover over the nipples and/or areola of the female breast, 
which device simulates and gives the realistic appearance of 
nipples and/or areola.  
3. "Public Place" includes all outdoor places owned by or open 
to the general public, and all buildings and enclosed places 
owned by or open to the general public, including such places of 
entertainment, taverns, restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance halls, 
banquet halls, party rooms or halls limited to specific members, 
restricted to adults or to patrons invited to attend, whether or not 
an admission charge is levied.  
10
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ten years old would be required to wear at least a g-string and pasties.68 The 
ordinance also included places where adult entertainment is offered in its 
definition of a “public place.”69 The plaintiff, Pap’s A.M., does business as 
“Kandyland" a business that features nude exotic dancing females.70 
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
The plaintiff brought suit in equity against the City of Erie,  the Mayor of 
Erie, and Erie City Council in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.71 The 
plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 75-1994 is 
unconstitutional.72 
 
After a hearing, the Erie County Common Pleas Court determined  
Ordinance 75-1994 placed an overly broad restriction on free expression in 
violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and held that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional “on its face”.73  The court struck down the 
                                                                                                                         
4. The prohibition set forth in subsection 1(c) shall not apply to:  
a. Any child under ten (10) years of age;  or  
b. Any individual exposing a breast in the process of 
breastfeeding an infant under two (2) years of age. . . . 
6. CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY--It is the intention of 
the City of Erie that the provisions of this ordinance be 
construed, enforced and interpreted in such a manner as will 
cause the least possible infringement of the constitutional rights 
of free speech, free expression, due process, equal protection or 
other fundamental rights consistent with the purposes of this 
ordinance.  Should a court of competent jurisdiction determine 
that any part of this ordinance, or any application or enforcement 
of it is excessively restrictive of such rights or liberties, then 
such portion of the ordinance, or specific application of the 
ordinance, shall be severed from the remainder, which shall 
continue in full force and effect.  
68 Id. § 2, Pap’s A.M., 719 A.2d at 275;. WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY defines 
“pasties” as: “a pair of small adhesive coverings worn by stripteasers.” WEBSTERS NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 1039 (2d ed. 1984).   
69 ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 75-1994 § 3. 
70 Pap’s A.M., 719 A.2d at 276. 
71 Id.  
72 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. Lexis 58 (Pa. 
1998), cert. granted, 1999 Lexis 3201 (U.S. 1999). Additionally the plaintiff sought injunctive 
relief and attorney’s fees. Id. 
73
 Id.; See supra Part II (C), for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.  
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ordinance and granted the plaintiff a permanent injunction.74   
 
Both parties appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court.75 The Commonwealth Court reversed the lower court’s decision, and 
held that the ordinance was not overly broad.76  The court also determined that 
Ordinance 75-1994 did not violate the plaintiff’s right to free expression.77 The 
Commonwealth Court found the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre,78 to be binding precedent.79   While the 
Commonwealth Court admitted no majority of the Barnes Court reached the 
decision on the same grounds, the Commonwealth Court: 
 
[S]elected the concurring opinion authored by Justice 
Souter as expressing the position of the Court and 
accorded it the status of binding precedent. In arriving at 
this conclusion, the Commonwealth Court quoted the 
United States Supreme Court's dictum that where "a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds. . . .and applied the theory to decide 
the case.80  
 
Pap’s A.M. then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which 
agreed to review the case.81  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to 
determine whether the ordinance was overly broad and whether it violated an 
individuals right to free expression, guaranteed by both the United States and 
the Pennsylvania Constitutions.82  
 
C.  Holding 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by  Justice 
                                                 
74
 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 
1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S.1999), the Common Pleas Court denied the plaintiffs 
request for attorney fees. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id.     
78 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 551 (1991).  
79
 Pap’s A.M., 719 A.2d at 275. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 
1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999).  
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Cappy,83 held Ordinance 75-1994 to be an unconstitutional infringement on 
free expression.84 First, the court determined that nude dancing was 
expression entitled to First Amendment protection.85   Second, the court 
determined Ordinance 75-1994 was a content-based limitation on free 
expression.86  Third, the court applied strict scrutiny analysis to the ordinance 
and determined it was not the least restrictive way to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.87  Finally, the court determined that it could not cure 
Ordinance 75-1994 by severing the portions of the ordinance that make it 
unconstitutional.88  
                                                 
83 Id., 719 A.2d at 284. Justice Cappy was joined by Chief Justice Flaherty and 
Justice Nigro. Id. 
84
 Pap’s A.M., 719 A.2d. at 281;  The court’s opinion held that the Ordinance 75-1994 
violates the plaintiff’s first amendment right of free expression. Id. The court did not 
decide whether the ordinance was constitutional under the  Pennsylvania State 
Constitution. Id.  The court also determined that there was no need to determine 
whether the ordinance was overly broad, Id. at 281 n. 12.  
85
 Id. at 276. While the court determined that being nude alone, is not entitled to First 
Amendment protection, nude dancing contains an expressive message; Id. at 278. 
The court used the opinions of eight justices in Barnes as precedent that nude 
dancing is expression entitled to First Amendment Protection. See, Barnes v. Glen 
Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding by eight Justices that nude dancing is 
expression);  See infra, Section II(A).  
86 Pap’s at 278, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not agree with the 
Commonwealth Court’s opinion that Justice Souter’s Opinion in Barnes v. Glen 
Theater was binding precedent, because five justices did not agree on this issue; Id. 
With no clear precedent the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertook an independent 
analysis of Ordinance 75-1994. Id. at 279. Using Justice White’s dissent in Barnes as 
persuasive authority the court determined that the intent of the “Ordinance is 
inextricably linked with the content-based motivation to suppress the expressive 
nature of nude dancing.” Id. 
87
Id.  
88  Id. at 280. While Pennsylvania law requires the court to sever unconstitutional 
portions of a law the court stated that was impossible with this ordinance. Id. 
Pennsylvania statutes require the court to cure the unconstitutionality of a statute by 
severing unconstitutional language unless the severed portions are essential to the 
statute. Id.  In this case the Appellees requested that the court cure the ordinance by 
only limiting it to non-expressive conduct. Id. The court stated that because the 
ordinance does not differentiate between expressive and non expressive conduct, the 
modification of the ordinance would require the court to perform a legislative duty, 
violative of the separation of powers doctrine. ERIE PA. ORDINANCE 75-1994 § 6, supra 
note 67, for the full text of the "Construction and Severability" clause of the Ordinance. 
See also, 1 PA. CONS. STAT . ANN. § 1925 (West 1998) (stating provisions regarding 
severablity of unconstitutional portions of statutes).   
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Justice Castille’s, concurring opinion89 argued that Barnes,90 provided 
binding precedent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was obliged to follow 
regarding the interpretation of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.91 However, the concurring Justice’s joined the court in its 
judgment determining that Ordinance 75-1994 violated the rights of free 
expression created under the Article I, Section 7, of the Pennsylvania State 
Constitution.92  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The majority in Pap’s A.M. correctly interpreted the policy behind free 
expression in a democratic society in regards to nude dancing. However, the 
court failed to use the correct route to make their decision.  If the court in Pap’s 
A.M. would have followed the analysis of the concurring justices, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have clearly defined the ability of local 
governments to regulate nude dancing in their Commonwealth.93 Instead, by 
deciding the case under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have ignored the will of the United 
States Supreme Court and invited a needless reversal of their decision. 
 
A.  Pap’s A.M. in Light of Barnes 
 
Interpreting the law can be a difficult task. When a state court examines 
an issue of United States constitutional law, they look to the United States 
                                                 
89 Pap’s A.M., 719 A.2d. at 281. Justice Castille’s concurring opinion was joined by 
Justice Zappala. Id. 
90 Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
91 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 282 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. 
LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). The concurring 
Justices argued that five Justices did agree on a central issue in Barnes. Id. They 
contend that in Barnes, five Justices (a majority) agreed that a similar ordinance was 
not intended to stifle the expression (i.e. content-neutral). Id.  
92 Id. Article I section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords broader protection than the 
United States Constitution. Id. Justice White’s dissent in Barnes provides persuasive 
authority that should be used to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 283. “The true 
purpose of the ordinance, as applied to appellant and others similarly situated, is to prevent 
the customers in appellant's and like establishments from being exposed to the distinctive 
communicative aspects of nude dancing.” Id. Lawmakers can not limit communication 
because they do not agree with the message. Id;  Barnes, 501 U.S. at 590-92 (White J., 
dissenting).    
93 Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A2d. 432, 239 (1973) (holding when the 
United States Supreme Court reverses on a federal issue the Pennsylvania 
court can reaffirm its decision on state constitutional grounds). 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss2/2
2000] PAP’S A.M. V. CITY OF ERIE 
 
Supreme Court94 for guidance.95  In the case of nude dancing, state courts 
have a more difficult time analyzing the law because a majority of United States 
Supreme Court Justices have not settled on a distinct legal theory.96  In Pap’s 
A.M., the court was confronted with issues recently decided by the United 
States Supreme Court97 and they ignored that decision.98  
 
Ignoring Barnes as binding precedent is premised on a faulty line of 
reasoning. According to the United States Supreme Court, “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
                                                 
94 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (1805), Chief Justice Marshall established the 
doctrine of judicial review when he wrote, “those who have framed written constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.” Id. at 177.  
95 Martin v. Hunter’s Leasee, 14 U.S. 304, 332 (1816) (holding the United States 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of state courts in all case 
arising under the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.) See, JOHN E. 
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (3rd ed. 1986). State laws are subordinate to 
the United States Constitution, federal treaties, and statutes through the supremacy 
clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. Id. 
96 Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions,  77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1992).(defining a plurality decision as a decision in which 
less then five justices of a nine member court do not make a decision based on the 
same rule.)   
The absence of a simple majority creates precedential uncertainty in 
plurality decisions. This precedential uncertainty may be seen as a 
function of three factors: (1) the difficulty in identifying a particular 
legal rule that a numerical majority of Justices support, (2) the 
difficulty in identifying a particular outcome that is justified in light of 
a single legal rule, and (3) the difficulty in explaining an adequate 
connection between the identified legal rule and the identified 
outcome. The critical inquiry is the identification of a legal rule that 
should have binding precedential impact.  
Id. 
97 Compare, Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (stating the application of 
nudity laws was constitutional); with, Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), 
reargument denied, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 Lexis 3201 
(U.S. 1999) (ruling an Erie Pennsylvania nudity ordinance was an unconstitutional limit 
on free expression).   
98
 Pap’s A.M, 719 A.2d. at 727. In Barnes v. Glen Theater, the United States Supreme 
Court “splintered and produced four separate, non- harmonious opinions.” Id at 727.  
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narrowest grounds.”99  Applying the “narrowest grounds model” to Barnes, 
Justice Souter’s opinion can be identified as binding precedent.100 Five of the 
Justices decided that the restrictions in Barnes were not attempts to restrict 
expression.101   
 
While it can be argued that  Ordinance 75-1994, fails as a proper time, 
place, and manner restriction,102 it appears unlikely the current Court will be 
receptive to the argument. Only Justice Stevens remains from the Barnes 
                                                 
99 Id; Kimura, supra  note 96, at 1603-05, the “narrowest grounds model” from Marks is the 
only Supreme Court recognized way the court has provided to interpret plurality decisions. Id. 
“The narrowest grounds model succeeds in coherently justifying the particular outcome of 
the case. The outcome of a plurality decision is a logical consequence of the legal rules that 
the concurring Justices provide. The Justices supporting the broader legal rule must 
necessarily recognize the validity of the narrower legal rule.” Cf., Id. at 1602. Another method 
of analyzing plurality opinions is the “Duel Majority Model.” Id. Under the Duel Majority 
Model, any rule that secures a majority of a court is a binding precedent. Id.  The problem 
with this model is that a binding rule may not justify the outcome of the case. Id.  Kimura cites 
a situation when the dissent and concurring opinions may agree on a rule of law that is 
inconsistent with the judgment in the case. Id.      
100 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. 
LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). ; Triplett Grille, Inc. v. 
The City of Akron, 40 F.3d. 129 (6th Cir. 1994), referring to Barnes, “Because Justice 
Souter's opinion articulates a common underlying approach, it may be said to decide 
the question presented to the Court in Barnes the "narrowest grounds." Id. at 134. 
101 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 550, 569 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Kennedy, Justice O’Connor decided that the act of nudity was not protected because 
the same message could be expressed if pasties and G-strings were worn. Id at 569. 
Justice Souter stated that the ordinance in Barnes was a constitutional time, place, 
and manner restriction because it was intended to lessen the secondary effects (i.e. 
sex crimes) that accompany nude dancing. Id. at 575 (Souter J., concurring).  
102  Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). (holding a city can rely 
upon studies from other cities as evidence that secondary effects was the predominate 
reason for enacting an ordinance). Id.  Videotape Transcript of Erie City Council 
Meeting,  (September 28, 1994). There is question as to whether the City ever 
discussed the effect of the ordinance on “secondary effects” basis. In the debate prior 
to passage of Ordinance 75-1994 the City Council appears to be concerned with 
establishing a moral tone for the city, not to deal with specific problems that would be 
served by a time, place and manner restriction on nude dancing.  Id. at 3, Council 
Member Mrs. Thompson by letter wrote, “[t]he value of this total nudity ban as added 
publicity reaffirms the commitment of its supporters to be guardians of the community 
standards of decency and respect long established in this family-oriented city.  
Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 802 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 
1993) (holding that secondary effects must be proved through studies and the city 
enacted regulations “incidental” to expression).     
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dissent and the five justices that makeup the “narrowest grounds” in Barnes, all 
remain on the Court.103   
 
B  Policy Behind Pap’s 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have eliminated the review of 
the United States Supreme Court by analyzing Ordinance 75-1994 under 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution instead of the First 
Amendment to United States Constitution.104 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
could have clearly established the law regarding limitations on nude dancing in 
Pennsylvania by adopting the analysis of the concurring opinion.  The court 
should have acknowledged Barnes as a binding precedent and decided the 
case on independent state grounds.105  
                                                 
103 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice O’Connor, participated in 
the Courts opinion; Justice Scalia joined in judgment holding  nude dancing was not 
protected by the First Amendment, and Justice Souter  concurred using the 
secondary effects analysis. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).    
104
  NOWAK ET AL.,  supra note 95, at 20 (stating that while state supreme courts 
are bound to the interpretation of  the United States Supreme Court regarding 
federal, state courts are the highest authority of the individual state law). 
105
 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ( “[Supreme Court] 
jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground 
and adequate to support the judgment.”); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 
A.2d. 887, 894 (Pa. 1988), Pennsylvania Courts are not bound by the rulings of 
the United States Supreme Court on issues arising under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.  Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General 
Life Insurance, 515 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Pa. 1986) (holding Article 1, Section 7 of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution is a restraint on the power of government to 
limit free expression).  See, William J. Brennan Jr.,  State Constitutions and the 
Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HAR L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).  Justice Brennan 
writes:   
[s]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their 
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. 
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, 
their protections often extending beyond those required 
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The 
legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore 
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective 
force of state law--for without it, the full realization of our 
liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
Id. Justice Brennan argues that States feel compelled to expand individual 
rights beyond the minimal limits of the United States Constitution because of  
inactivity of the Supreme Court in regards to civil liberties. Id. See, TRIBE, supra 
note 32, at § 3-33, 123, at a minimum a state law must meet the fundamental 
17
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An analysis of the policy and legislative history of Ordinance 75-1994 
shows that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly determined that the 
limitations in Pap’s A.M., were content-based.106 While the Supreme Court has 
a right and power to determine federal law, as policy Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion in Barnes and the Court’s decision in Renton are a 
misapplication of the doctrine of content-neutral speech.107  
 
The basic idea behind the First Amendment is “that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”108  In Barnes and Renton, the Supreme Court has 
subrogated sexually oriented expression to a lower level of First Amendment 
protection and made a determination based on the content of the speech.109      
 
The legislative history of Ordinance 75-1994 shows that the City 
Council of Erie enacted Ordinance 75-1994 to establish a community standard 
for morality by stopping the expression of nude dancing.110 Erie City Council 
Member Thompson urged the passage of Ordinance 75-1994 by writing “the 
problem here is we are talking about public standards and public decency.  .  .  
[w]e’re not talking about nudity. . . [w]e’re talking about what is indecent and 
immoral.”111 The Council enacted Ordinance 75-1994 not because of 
                                                                                                                         
fairness requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
106 Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Brennan J.,  dissent).  
107 The Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 190, 200 (1986), The basis 
of the application of a content-neutral restriction on adult oriented businesses is 
actually a content-based limitation on free expression creating a slippery slope upon 
which all expression could slide. Id. 
108 Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).  
See, Stone, supra note 18, at 212-13. Stone explains the basic concept of the 
First Amendment when he writes:  
[t]he Court has long embraced an ''antipaternalistic" 
understanding of the first amendment. It has observed, 
for example, that the first amendment assumes that 
ideas and information are not in themselves harmful, 
that people will perceive their own best interests if 
only they are well enough informed, and that the best 
means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them. 
Id.   
109 Servodidio, supra note 7, at 1245, "In contrast to the decisions in the context of 
zoning, the courts directly weigh the expressive value of nude dancing against the 
various interests asserted by the state in support of suppression." Id. 
110 Videotape Transcript of Erie City Council Meeting (September 28, 1994).  
111 Videotape Transcript of Erie City Council Meeting, 3-4 (September 28, 1994). 
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secondary effects, or to establish a time, place, and manner  restriction, but 
rather the Council set out to establish a moral climate for the City.112  
 
In Pap’s A.M., the  court accepted the dissent as persuasive authority 
contending the dissent captured the policy behind the right of free 
expression.113  Article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania constitution protects the 
same policy the dissent claimed the First Amendment protected.114  Using the 
same policy that was used in the dissent, the court could have determined 
Ordinance 75-1994 is a content-based limitation on free expression and 
applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the ordinance.115  While the prevention of 
sex crimes is a compelling government interest,  the ordinance is not narrowly 
tailored.116  Based on this logic Ordinance 75-1994 is an unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                         
Peter M. Cicchino,  Reason And The Rule Of Law: Should Bare Assertions Of 
"Public Morality" Qualify As Legitimate Government Interests For The 
Purposes Of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. LJ 139, 140 (1988). “Bare 
public morality" arguments defend a law by asserting a legitimate government 
interest in prohibiting or encouraging certain human behavior without any 
empirical connection to goods other than the alleged good of eliminating or 
increasing, as the case may be, the behavior at issue.  Id.  
112 Id. at 4. Council Member Mr. Maras said, “One person called me and asked 
me, they knew I voted for the ordinance last time, and it was a woman . . ., 
say, you know, ‘If I – these people that are for this total nudity, wonder if they 
had a daughter eighteen years old  or older . . . would they allow their 
daughter to dance totally nude in the Erie area?’ I doubt if many would stand 
up and come before us tonight and say they would.”           
113 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. 
LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). 
114 Id. at 279.  
115  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983), (holding content based 
restrictions will be upheld if they are narrowly written to meet a compelling 
governmental interest).    
116 Pap’s A.M. v Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998), reargument denied, 1999 Pa. 
LEXIS 58 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 LEXIS 3201 (U.S. 1999). While the court 
agreed that the prevention of sex crimes (i.e. rape and prostitution) was a compelling 
government interest, the court did not believe the nudity ordinance was narrowly 
tailored to reach that interest. Id at 279. The court stated that less restrictive methods 
could serve to reduce sex crimes. Id. The court indicated that regulations regarding 
the hours of operation, distance between patrons and dancers or dispersing the 
businesses through the City would be less restrictive ways of achieving the compelling 
interest. Id. See, Ron Kalyan, comment, Regulation of Nude Dancing in Bring Your 
Own Bottle Establishments in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Are the 
Commonwealth’s Municipalities Left to Fend for Themselves?, 99 DICK L. REV. 169, 
181 (1994) (writing that municipalities can utilize regulations such as control of the 
locations of clubs and restriction of hours to reduce conflicts with residents and reduce 
19
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restriction on free expression.117  
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not be alone if they followed 
this line of reasoning.  Other state’s have also held similar provisions against 
nude dancing are unconstitutional using their state constitution.118 The key 
factor in these decisions is that “[n]udity of the dancer is an integral part of the 
emotions and thoughts that a nude dancing performance evokes.”119 These 
states and Pennsylvania have recognized that limits upon the message of 
expression leads to a slippery slope in which policy makers can place 




Ultimately, the speculation and the analysis of this note will be finally 
decided.121  The United States Supreme Court will redecide what the United 
States Constitution allows in regard to limitations on nude dancing. If the Court 
holds as it did in Barnes,  the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will likely have an 
opportunity to revisit the case using only Pennsylvania law.122 However, time 
and confusion could have been avoided if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
used the proper route to their proper decision. By applying Pennsylvania law in 
Pap’s A.M., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have clearly established 
the limits of state power to control nude dancing in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Michael McBride  
                                                                                                                         
crime). 
117 Id.  
118 See, e.g.,  O’Day v. King County 749 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1988) (holding non-obscene 
nude dancing to be constitutionally protected); 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm’s, 
799 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1990) (holding free speech was a fundamental right protected by 
the United States and Colorado Constitution, only content neutral restrictions 
regarding time, place, and manner of speech are constitutional). 
119 Barnes v. Glen Theatre 501 U.S. 550, 560 (1991) (White J., dissent); Schad v. Mt. 
Empraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding nudity alone does not place protected 
material outside the mantle of the First Amendment).  
120  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ( holding a man could not be 
prosecuted for wearing a shirt which said “Fuck the Draft”) Justice Harlan wrote, 
“because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that 
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.” Id. 
121 The United States Supreme Court will hear the case during the 1999-2000 term.  
122  Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A2d. 432, 239 (1973). 
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